Security of quantum cryptography using balanced homodyne detection by Namiki, Ryo & Hirano, Takuya
ar
X
iv
:q
ua
nt
-p
h/
02
05
19
1v
2 
 2
7 
Fe
b 
20
03
Security of quantum cryptography using balanced homodyne detection
Ryo Namiki∗ and Takuya Hirano
Department of Physics, Gakushuin University, Mejiro 1-5-1, Toshima-ku, Tokyo 171-8588, Japan
(Dated: December 12, 2002)
In this paper we investigate the security of a quantum cryptographic scheme which utilizes bal-
anced homodyne detection and weak coherent pulses (WCP). The performance of the system is
mainly characterized by the intensity of the WCP and postselected threshold. Two of the simplest
intercept and resend eavesdropping attacks are analyzed. The secure key gain for a given loss is also
discussed in terms of the pulse intensity and threshold.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 42.50.Lc
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum cryptography allows two parties, Alice (the
sender) and Bob (the receiver), to share a random bit se-
quence, called key, which is unknown to the eavesdropper
Eve [1].
In the past years several quantum cryptographic
schemes, which are mainly based on two-level quantum
systems, have been proposed [1, 2, 3, 4], and various
theoretical studies on the security have been published
[5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11]. A conventional security measure
of quantum cryptographic system is the secure key gain
which represents the secure key bits gain per signal [8, 9].
Recently, continuous variable quantum cryptographic
schemes have been proposed [12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17].
The security of those schemes is based on the commuta-
tion relation between the quadrature amplitudes of light
field. The quadrature measurement is implemented by
balanced homodyne detection [18]. Since balanced ho-
modyne detection involves phase-shift operation and the
most conventional signal source is coherent pulses, a cer-
tain combination of phase modulations and homodyne
detection with a coherent pulse should provide the sim-
plest continuous variable schemes from the experimental
side. In this point an interesting scheme is the application
of homodyning on the phase coding four-state protocol,
and this scheme includes a postselection process which
is deeply related to the system performance [19]. The
importance of the postselection is discussed in Ref. [17].
In this paper we investigate the security of a quan-
tum cryptographic scheme which uses balanced homo-
dyne detection and weak coherent pulses [19]. In Sec.
II we review the principles of the scheme and introduce
basic quantities to describe the system. In Sec. III we
consider two of the intercept and resend eavesdropping
attacks. By explicitly writing the density operator of the
signal, all the detectable disturbances can be seen. The
change of the quadrature probability distribution and the
bit error rate (BER) caused by the attacks are shown. In
Sec. IV we consider a beam splitting attack and then
show the secure key gain for a given loss.
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II. QUANTUM CRYPTOGRAPHY USING
BALANCED HOMODYNE DETECTION
In this section we review the protocol [19] and intro-
duce a density operator description. Then we derive the
formula for the BER in the absence of Eve. The pro-
tocol is similar to that of the interferometric quantum
cryptography using four nonorthogonal states [3] except
quadrature measurement is performed by balanced ho-
modyne detection with a strong local oscillator field [18].
A. Protocol and basic quantities
The protocol is as follows: Alice randomly chooses one
of the four coherent states {|α〉, |iα〉, | − α〉, | − iα〉} with
α > 0 and sends it to Bob. If Alice uses a pulsed light
source, the coherent state is the eigenstate of the annihi-
lation operator aˆ of the pulse mode [20, 21]. Then Bob
randomly measures one of the two quadratures {xˆ1, xˆ2}.
We define the quadratrures by the relation aˆ = xˆ1 + ixˆ2,
thus [xˆ1, xˆ2] = i/2. After the transmission of a large
number of pulses, Alice and Bob communicate through a
classical channel and they divide the resulted data into
two parts:correct-basis data and wrong-basis data. We
say a pulse is correct-basis in the cases that Bob mea-
sures xˆ1 when Alice sent | ± α〉 and Bob measures xˆ2
when Alice sent | ± iα〉. The other cases, the pulse is
called wrong-basis. For the correct-basis pulses Bob sets
the threshold x0(≥ 0) and constructs his bit sequence by
the following decision:
(bit value) =


1 if x > x0
0 if x < −x0
inconclusive otherwise,
(1)
where x is the result of Bob’s measurement. Alice’s bit
values are determined by the different manner: Alice re-
gards {|α〉, |iα〉} as “1” and {| − α〉, | − iα〉} as “0”.
The density operator of the signal sent by Alice is de-
scribed by
ρˆ =
1
4
(|α〉〈α| + | − α〉〈−α|+ |iα〉〈iα| + | − iα〉〈−iα|) ,
(2)
2where the factor 14 denotes that each of the four states ap-
pears with equal probability. Eve’s task is to distinguish
the four states. Since the four states are not orthogonal
with each other, complete differentiation is impossible. If
Alice announces the basis, i.e., the quadrature on which
she encoded the bit information, then the density opera-
tor is reduced to
ρˆ1 =
1
2
(|α〉〈α| + | − α〉〈−α|) (3)
or
ρˆ2 =
1
2
(|iα〉〈iα|+ | − iα〉〈−iα|) (4)
for the announced quadrature xˆ1 and xˆ2, respectively.
Thus Bob’s task is in a sense to differentiate between the
two states {|α〉, |−α〉}. The decision (1) is a practical and
efficient implementation of this task. Although various
differentiation tasks have been studied based on gener-
alized quantum measurement process [7, 22, 23, 24], in
this paper we consider only the measurements which can
be realized by conventional optics and detectors.
For a quantitative description, it is convenient to in-
troduce the probability density that the outcome xφ is
obtained by measuring xˆφ = xˆ1 cosφ + xˆ2 sinφ of a co-
herent state |α〉
|〈xφ|α〉|2 =
√
2
pi
exp
[−2(xφ − α cosφ)2]. (5)
Then the probability distribution of quadrature mea-
sured by Bob is written as
〈xi|ρˆj |xi〉 =


1√
2pi
{
exp
[−2(xi − α)2]+ exp [−2(xi + α)2]} if i = j
√
2
pi exp
(−2x2i ) if i 6= j,
(6)
with i, j = 1, 2 (see Fig. 1). i = j is for correct-basis
pulses and i 6= j is for wrong-basis ones. If Alice an-
nounces the states she sent, Bob observes the quadrature
distributions for the coherent states (see Fig. 1). The
quadrature distributions represent the conditional prob-
ability that characterizes the signal detection and thus
any detectable disturbance should appear on the distri-
butions.
Since we can treat the quadratures xˆ1 and xˆ2 equally,
hereafter we consider only the cases that Bob measures
xˆ1. Then we refer |±α〉 as correct-basis pulses and |±iα〉
as wrong-basis pulses.
B. Postselection efficiency and bit error rate
We define the postselection efficiency as the probabil-
ity that the absolute value of correct-basis pulse’s quadra-
ture |x| exceeds the threshold x0. With this probability a
correct-basis pulse gives a bit value according to decision
(1). The postselection efficiency in the absence of Eve is
written as
P (x0, n) =
∫ −x0
−∞
〈x1|ρˆ1|x1〉dx1 +
∫ ∞
x0
〈x1|ρˆ1|x1〉dx1
=
1
2
{
erfc
[√
2
(
x0 +
√
n
)]
+ erfc
[√
2
(
x0 −
√
n
)]}
, (7)
where
erfc(x) =
2√
pi
∫ ∞
x
exp (−t2)dt, (8)
and n = α2 is the pulse intensity (the mean photon num-
ber per pulse). If x0 = 0, then every correct-basis pulse
gives a bit value, thus P (0, n) = 1 for any n ≥ 0. For a
given x0 the BER can be written as the probability that
Bob’s measurement of xˆ1 results an outcome x1 < −x0
when Alice sent the state |α〉 divided by P (x0, n)
q(x0, n) =
1
P (x0, n)
∫ −x0
−∞
|〈x1|α〉|2 dx
=
1
2P (x0, n)
erfc
[√
2
(
x0 +
√
n
)]
. (9)
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FIG. 1: The quadrature distributions for correct-basis
〈x1|ρˆ1|x1〉, wrong-basis 〈x1|ρˆ2|x1〉 pulses and the coherent
states |〈x1| ± α〉|
2 for the pulse intensity n = α2 = 1 in the
absence of the eavesdropper. The correct-basis and wrong-
basis distributions are observed after Alice’s announcement
of the basis. In contrast to this, the distributions for the co-
herent states cannot be observed until Alice announces the
states, and the announcement of the states sacrifices the key
bits. The bit errors originate from the overlap between the
Gaussian distributions |〈x1| ± α〉|
2 and they are mainly dis-
tributed around x = 0. Bob can efficiently cut out some of
these bit errors by introducing the threshold x0 and discard-
ing the inconclusive results ( |x| ≤ x0) when he constructs the
key bits.
P and q are decreasing functions of x0. This means that
Bob can obtain smaller BER sacrificing the efficiency by
raising the threshold value.
Because the BER is a function of n and x0, the se-
curity of the system depends on a priori selected n and
postselected x0. The parameters should be determined
so that the system provides higher security. For this pur-
pose we consider the simplest eavesdropping attacks in
the following sections.
III. EAVESDROPPING: INTERCEPT AND
RESEND
In this section we consider two of the intercept and
resend eavesdropping attacks. The density operators of
the disturbed signals are explicitly shown and then the
quadrature distributions and BERs are obtained.
A. Simultaneous measurement attack
Here we show the effects of a simultaneous measure-
ment attack as a function of n. Eve’s strategy is as fol-
lows. She splits the signal into two pulses of half intensity
by using a 50:50 beam splitter (BS) and measures xˆ1 of
one pulse and xˆ2 of the other pulse. Then Eve obtains
a pair of values (x˜1, x˜2) for each signal. The inequality
between x˜1 and x˜2 determines the most probable state
as follows: 

|α〉 if x˜1 ≥ |x˜2|
|iα〉 if x˜2 > |x˜1|
| − α〉 if −x˜1 ≥ |x˜2|
| − iα〉 if −x˜2 > |x˜1|.
(10)
Thus Eve resends the signal to Bob according to this de-
cision. It should be noted that the extra noise of simul-
taneous measurement is minimized in this measurement
for the case of a coherent state [18, 25], however, this
does not mean that this measurement gives the optimal
differentiation of the four states.
To write down the density operator of Eve’s resending
signal, let us consider the case that Alice sent |α〉. The
probability that Eve gets an outcome (x˜1, x˜2) is given by
the product of the two quadrature distributions for the
split coherent states
Qn(x˜1, x˜2) =
∣∣∣∣〈x1
∣∣∣ α√
2
〉∣∣∣∣
2 ∣∣∣∣〈x2
∣∣∣ α√
2
〉∣∣∣∣
2
∣∣∣∣∣
x1=x˜1,x2=x˜2
=
2
pi
exp
[
−2
(
x˜1 −
√
n
2
)2
− 2x˜22
]
. (11)
The resending signal can be characterized by three prob-
abilities p+, p⊥, and p−: The first one is that Eve resends
the original state |α〉 correctly
p+(n) =
∫
x1≥|x2|
Qn(x1, x2)dx1dx2. (12)
The second one is that Eve resends either of pi/2-phase-
shifted states | ± iα〉
p⊥(n) =
∫
x2>|x1|
Qn(x1, x2)dx1dx2. (13)
The last one is the probability that Eve resends the pi-
phase-shifted state | − α〉
p−(n) =
∫
−x1≥|x2|
Qn(x1, x2)dx1dx2. (14)
Consequently, the original state is transformed as
|α〉〈α| →
p+|α〉〈α| + p−| − α〉〈−α|
+p⊥ (|iα〉〈iα|+ | − iα〉〈−iα|) . (15)
The quadrature distribution of this signal for n = 1 is
shown in Fig. 2.
As a result, Bob’s density operators after Alice’s an-
nouncement of the basis, say ρˆ′1 and ρˆ
′
2, are expressed
as
ρˆ′1 = (p+ + p−)ρˆ1 + 2p⊥ρˆ2, (16)
ρˆ′2 = 2p⊥ρˆ1 + (p+ + p−)ρˆ2. (17)
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FIG. 2: Disturbed quadrature distributions for the pulse
intensity n = 1. The solid line shows the quadrature distri-
butions in the absence of Eve |〈x1|α〉|
2. The dotted line is for
the simultaneous measurement attack, and the dashed line
is for the intermediate basis attack. These distributions are
observed if Alice announces the states.
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FIG. 3: The correct-basis distributions and wrong-basis ones
for n = 1. The solid lines are for the absence of Eve. The dot-
ted lines describe the case that Eve performs the simultaneous
measurement; the curve that has the maximum at x = 0 is
for wrong-basis pulses. The dash-dot line represents the re-
sult of the intermediate basis attack, where the correct-basis
and wrong-basis distributions take the same form.
In these formulas the terms including p⊥ indicate the
part where Eve encodes the bit information on the wrong-
basis. The quadrature distributions for the correct-basis
pulse and wrong-basis pulse are given by 〈x1|ρˆ′1|x1〉 and
〈x1|ρˆ′2|x1〉, respectively (see Fig. 3). A remarkable point
is that Bob observes the effects of eavesdropping in the
wrong-basis data as well as in the correct-basis data.
To calculate Bob’s BER in the presence of Eve, we
rewrite the postselection efficiency
P ′(1)(x0, n) =
∫ ∞
x0
〈x1|ρˆ′1|x1〉dx1 +
∫ −x0
−∞
〈x1|ρˆ′1|x1〉dx1
= (p+ + p−)P (x0, n) + 2p⊥ erfc
(√
2x0
)
.
(18)
With this equation we obtain Bob’s BER
q
(1)
EB(x0, n) =
1
P ′(1)(x0, n)
(
p+
∫ ∞
x0
|〈x1| − α〉|2 dx+ p−
∫ ∞
x0
|〈x1|α〉|2 dx+ 2p⊥
∫ ∞
x0
〈x1|ρˆ2|x1〉dx
)
=
1
2P ′(1)(x0, n)
{
p+ erfc
[√
2
(
x0 +
√
n
)]
+ p− erfc
[√
2
(
x0 −
√
n
)]
+ 2p⊥ erfc
(√
2x0
)}
.
(19)
After the classical communication Eve may know the basis on which Alice encoded the bit information for
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FIG. 4: The BERs as functions of the pulse intensity n for
the threshold x0 = 0. The solid line is Bob’s BER in the ab-
sence of Eve q(0, n). The dash-dot line shows Bob’s BER
for the simultaneous measurement attack q
(1)
EB
(0, n). The
dashed line is for the intermediate basis attack q
(2)
EB
(0, n).
The dotted line is Eve’s BER for the two of the attacks
q
(1)
E
(0, n) = q
(2)
E
(0, n) = q(0, n/2).
each pulse, and Eve’s information is determined by the
quadrature value of split signal measured in the “correct-
basis”. Thus Eve’s BER is q
(1)
E (0, n) = q(0, n/2) (see Fig.
4). Note that Eve’s threshold is always zero because she
cannot select the parts of the data that contribute to the
key bits.
B. Intermediate basis attack
Here we consider an eavesdropping strategy that Eve
measures the intermediate basis operator xˆpi/4 ≡ xˆ1+xˆ2√2 .
In the case that Eve performs single homodyne detection
for each pulse, the intermediate basis minimizes her BER
on the average.
By measuring xˆpi/4, Eve obtains her BER q
(2)
E (0, n) =
q(0, n/2). Since she has no information about Alice’s
choice of the basis, she encodes the bit information on
the intermediate basis when she resends the pulse to
Bob. Namely, Eve resends |α exp(ipi/4)〉 if the outcome
xpi/4 ≥ 0 and | − α exp(ipi/4)〉 otherwise. This operation
transforms the four states as
| ± α〉〈±α|, | ± iα〉〈±iα| →
(1 − qE)| ± αeipi/4〉〈±αeipi/4|+ qE | ∓ αeipi/4〉〈∓αeipi/4|.
(20)
An example of the resulted quadrature distributions is
shown in Fig. 2. It yields the same distribution for the
correct-basis pulse and wrong-basis pulse (see Fig. 3).
This feature originates from the fact that Eve has no
information about Alice’s choice of the basis.
From transformation (20), Bob’s postselection effi-
ciency is given by
P ′(2)(x0, n) =
∫ ∞
x0
(∣∣∣〈x1|αeipi/4〉∣∣∣2 + ∣∣∣〈x1| − αeipi/4〉∣∣∣2
)
dx1
= P (x0, n/2). (21)
Then, considering the case that Alice sends |α〉 and Bob gets x1 < −x0 we obtain Bob’s BER (see Fig. 4):
q
(2)
EB(x0, n) =
1
P ′(2)(x0, n)
∫ −x0
−∞
dx
(
[1− qE(n)]
∣∣∣〈x1|αeipi/4〉∣∣∣2 + qE(n) ∣∣∣〈x1| − αeipi/4〉∣∣∣2
)
= [1− qE(n)]q(x0, n/2) + qE(n)
2P ′(2)(x0, n)
erfc
[√
2
(
x0 −
√
n/2
)]
. (22)
As shown in Fig. 2, the non-Gaussian distribution re-
veals the presence of Eve. This feature can also be seen
in the wrong-basis distribution in Fig. 3. The monitor-
ing of the wrong-basis distribution profile restricts Eve’s
operation. For instance, suppose that Eve resends a co-
herent state for each pulse. Then the density operator
after Alice’s announcement of the basis can be written
as the mixture of coherent states
ρˆ′2 =
∑
r,θ
w(r, θ)|reiθ〉〈reiθ |, (23)
with
∑
r,θ
w(r, θ) = 1, w(r, θ) ≥ 0,
for r ≥ 0 and − pi ≤ θ < pi.
If Bob observes no disturbance in the wrong-basis distri-
bution, i.e., 〈x1|ρˆ′2|x1〉 = 〈x1|ρˆ2|x1〉, we find the condi-
6tion w(r, θ) = 0 for all θ 6= ±pi/2. The trivial solution
which satisfies this condition is that Eve resends the vac-
uum state [w(r, θ) = 0 for r 6= 0] which induces Bob’s
BER of 0.5. The other solutions require that Eve distin-
guishes between ρˆ1 and ρˆ2 without error. Similarly, the
monitoring of the correct-basis distribution profile gives
additional limitations on Eve’s operation.
Although the security proof needs more analysis about
Eve’s operation and leaked information, most of the at-
tacks cannot work provided Bob observes the distribu-
tions carefully. An undetectable attack is the beam split-
ting attack shown in the next section.
IV. SECURE KEY GAIN FOR A GIVEN LOSS
For any practical implementation of quantum cryptog-
raphy, the transmission loss is an unavoidable problem
[10, 11]. The loss weakens the signal intensity and in the
same time it potentially causes the information leakage to
Eve. In order to estimate the performance of the system
for a given loss, we consider a beam splitting attack and
calculate the secure key gain which gives the secure bits
gain per signal [8, 9]. The threshold and pulse intensity
can be selected to maximize the secure key gain.
We assume that (1) Eve has a lossless optical fiber,
and (2) Eve can store the light pulses for an arbitrar-
ily long time before measuring them. Then Eve replaces
the original transmission path with her lossless fiber and
splits the pulse using an asymmetric BS with reflection
efficiency 1 − η which is equal to the original transmis-
sion loss, so that Eve does not change the pulse intensity
received by Bob. Further, she measures her split signal
in the correct-basis by delaying her measurements until
she have received the basis information.
After the error correction Alice and Bob share the same
bit sequence, thus the question is how well are the out-
comes of Eve’s measurements correlated to the transmit-
ted states. The correlation is estimated by the relative
expected collision probability Pc which determines the
fraction τ = 1 + log2 Pc, by which the bit sequence is
shortened in the privacy amplification process [26]. Fi-
nally, Alice and Bob can bound Eve’s Shannon informa-
tion about the key by discarding s bits,
IE ≤ 2
−s
ln 2
. (24)
Let us consider the signal transmission that the binary
signals {|α〉, |−α〉} are sent and the homodyne detection∫
dx1|x1〉〈x1| is performed. The collision probability for
the beam splitting attack is determined as follows: Ac-
cording to [6], the relative expected collision probability
can be written as
Pc =
∑
β=±α
∑
x1
p2(x1, β)
Prob(x1)
, (25)
where p(x1, β) is the joint probability of the sent signal
|β〉 and the measured quadrature value x1, and Prob(x1)
is the probability that the measurement results x1,
Prob(x1) = 〈x1|ρˆ1|x1〉. (26)
The conditional probability that the state is |α〉 when the
measurement results x1 is given by
Prob(α|x1) = |〈x1|α〉|
2
|〈x1|α〉|2 + |〈x1| − α〉|2
. (27)
Then we obtain the joint probability by the product
p(x1, α) = Prob(α|x1) Prob(x1). Thus the fraction is
written as a function of the pulse intensity n = α2:
τ(n) = 1 + log2 Pc
= 1 + log2

√ 2
pi
∫ ∞
0
dx
exp
[
−4 (x−√n)2
]
+ exp
[
−4 (x+√n)2
]
exp
[
−2 (x−√n)2
]
+ exp
[
−2 (x+√n)2
]

, (28)
where we replaced the x1 summation to the integration
∫∞
−∞ dx1.
Using this expression we obtain the secure key gain (with ideal error correction) [9]
G(x0, n, η) =
1
2
P (x0, ηn) [IAB(x0, ηn)− τ((1− η)n)] , (29)
where
IAB(x0, n) =
∑
|x|>x0
Prob(x)
P (x0, n)
[
1 + Prob(
√
n|x) log2 Prob(
√
n|x) + Prob(−√n|x) log2 Prob(−
√
n|x)] (30)
is the mutual information between Alice and Bob [5, 7], and (1 − η)n is the lost pulse intensity received by Eve,
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FIG. 5: The secure key gain G as a function of the loss
1 − η for the pulse intensity n = 1 and the threshold values
x0 = 0, 0.3, 0.5, 1.0, 1.5.
and ηn is the pulse intensity received by Bob. The loss
region where the secure key is obtainable is defined by
G > 0. The region is determined by the sign of IAB − τ
because P is always positive. Since IAB is an increasing
function of x0 and IAB → 1(x0 → ∞), it is always pos-
sible to find a sufficiently large value of x0 that satisfies
G > 0 for any η > 0 and n > 0 if τ < 1.
Typical behavior of G as a function of 1− η for a fixed
n is shown in Fig. 5. For a given value of x0, G rapidly
vanishes at a certain value of 1−η. By raising the value of
x0 we can extend the loss region where the secure key is
obtainable. For fixed n and 1−η, P is a decreasing func-
tion of x0 and IAB is an increasing function of x0. Thus,
the trade-off between P and IAB determines the optimal
threshold which maximizes G [see Fig. 6(a)]. Then by
comparing G for various n at the optimal threshold, we
can optimize n and x0 simultaneously to maximize G for
a given value of 1 − η. The optimal value is G = 0.27
(x0 = 0.22, n = 0.89) for 10% loss, G = 4.0 × 10−2
(x0 = 0.64, n = 0.62) for 50% loss, and G = 6.0 × 10−6
(x0 = 1.91, n = 0.59) for 90% loss. Figure 6(b) shows
G for several values of n at the optimal threshold as a
function of 1− η.
The limitation for the key gain against the beam split-
ting attack under the assumption that Eve can use a
positive operator valued measure for the split individual
pulse is presented in Ref. [27].
V. CONCLUSIONS AND REMARKS
We investigated the security of quantum cryptography
using balanced homodyne detection. For the two of the
intercept and resend attacks, we derived the disturbed
density operator of the signal and showed the quadrature
distributions and BER as functions of the pulse intensity
and postselected threshold. Both of the attacks are de-
tectable only by the monitoring of the wrong-basis dis-
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
0.54 0.55
0.70
0.75
D loss 1-η
n (photon/pulse)
 0.1
 0.2
 0.5
 1.0
 1.5
 2.0
o
pt
im
al
 th
re
sh
ol
d
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
-7
-6
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0.80 0.81
-3.5
-3.0
n (photon/pulse)
 0.1
 0.2
 0.5
 1.0
 1.5
 2.0
E loss 1-η
lo
g 1
0 
o
f  
G
 
 
(ga
in/
pu
lse
)
FIG. 6: (a) The optimal thresholds for the values of the pulse
intensity n = 0.1, 0.2, 0.5, 1.0, 1.5, 2.0 as functions of the loss
1− η. (b) The key gain G at the optimal threshold.
tribution profile. Our examples show that Eve’s possible
operations are greatly restricted if she does not disturb
the quadrature distributions. However, in our formula,
which describes only the signal density operator, the re-
lation between the observed signal disturbance and po-
tentially leaked information is unclear. Further analysis
needs more general description.
We presented the secure key gain for a given loss, pro-
vided Eve performs a beam splitting attack. We can
extend the loss region where the secure key is obtain-
able by raising the threshold value. The pulse intensity
and threshold can be selected to maximize the secure key
gain.
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